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# **Military Leadership Diversity Commission**

## **Decision Paper #7:**

### **Implementation and Accountability**

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**February 2011**

MLDC decision papers present the Commission-approved, subcommittee-specific recommendations. These recommendations are the product not only of the logic and evidence presented in the decision papers but also the values and judgments of the Commissioners. Legally imposed time constraints naturally limited the Commission's ability to undertake extensive research. Thus, the decision papers present the evidence that was available and that could be collected during the discovery phase of the Commission. The decision papers were reviewed by subject-matter experts external to the Commission.

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## INTRODUCTION

Based on its tasking from Congress, the Military Leadership Diversity Commission (MLDC) pursued two paths. The first was aimed at increasing the representation of racial and ethnic minorities and women in U.S. military leadership. The second was based on a definition of diversity that included yet went beyond race, ethnicity, and gender to encompass “differences,” broadly understood: *Diversity is all the different characteristics and attributes of individuals that are consistent with core values, integral to overall readiness and mission accomplishment, and reflective of the nation we serve.*

The definition is consistent with equal opportunity (EO) policies and practices yet acknowledges that individuals come to the military not only with different cultural backgrounds but also with different skills, experiences, and talents, many of which may be operationally relevant. With proper leadership, diversity can increase military agility and responsiveness. And, if policies resulting from the new definition are properly implemented and assessed, the new concept will help to further eliminate discrimination and guide the Department of Defense (DoD) along a path of inclusion.

Thus, for the Commission, diversity management covers both demographic characteristics and other types of differences. Effective and accountable diversity management is about managing differences to optimize organizational capability, whether differences refer to demographics, cognitive types and skills, place in the organizational structure, or identity within the broader global community.

This decision paper documents the work of the Implementation and Accountability (I&A) Subcommittee and puts forth the Commission’s recommendations on how DoD and the Services can do two things:

- effectively implement both the traditional understanding of diversity as race, ethnicity, and gender and the new understanding of diversity reflected in the Commission’s definition
- hold leaders accountable so that diversity efforts are sustained.

The decision paper also describes the logic and research on which the recommendations are based. It does not replicate work contained in other decision papers but refers the reader to them where appropriate.

### **Strategy to Examine Implementation and Accountability Practices**

The I&A Subcommittee addressed seven of the Commission’s 16 charter tasks. Each task listed below is followed by a brief description of the subcommittee’s approach to that task. The results of the subcommittee’s efforts to address these tasks will be described in the presentation of recommendations that follows.

1. *Assess “the current institutional structure of the Office of Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity of the Department of Defense, and of similar offices of the Military Departments, and their ability to ensure effective and accountable diversity management across the Department of Defense.”*

Based on its understanding that diversity management encompasses plans, policies, and practices, the Commission assigned this charter task on diversity management to two subcommittees: I&A, which addressed diversity management plans and policies, and Diversity Leadership and Diversity Leadership Training, which addressed diversity management practices.<sup>1</sup> In addressing this task, the I&A subcommittee looked at the placement and structure of the diversity offices within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the military departments and Services. It assessed their places in the organizational hierarchy with respect to

- seniority
- access to leadership
- scope of activities
- ability to influence diversity-related functions.

It also collected data on the budgets of the diversity offices and the size of their staffs.

2. *Explore “the options available for improving the substance or implementation of current plans and policies of the Department of Defense and the Military Departments.”*

The subcommittee investigated current plans and policies of DoD, the military departments, and the Services with regard to diversity and, in some cases, EO (Issue Paper #50). Among the characteristics of interest were the status of plans and policies, their content, and whether they contained accountability mechanisms.

3. *Consider the “incorporation of private sector practices successful in cultivating diverse leadership.”*

The subcommittee investigated “best practices” in the private sector and in other government agencies. It drew on briefings to the Commission and examined policies and programs in use at companies considered good at managing diversity (Issue Papers #48 and #49). The scope of this work included practices for increasing demographic diversity, the broader notion of creating an inclusive environment, and managing change (Issue Paper #21).

4. *Evaluate “efforts to develop and maintain diverse leadership at all levels of the Armed Forces.”*
5. *Analyze “successes and failures of efforts of developing and maintaining a diverse leadership, particularly at the general and flag officer positions.”*

The subcommittee considered these two tasks in tandem. It approached its evaluation of efforts through leveraging the work of other subcommittees and through issue papers documenting the demographic profile of the active-duty, commissioned officer, enlisted, and warrant officer populations (Issue Papers #13, #19, and #44). Successes and failures of specific diversity efforts were collected through interviews with diversity managers in the Services and OSD.

6. *Determine “the status of prior recommendations made to the DoD and Congress concerning diversity initiatives within the Armed Forces.”*

The subcommittee reviewed major reports and analyses from the past 20 years.

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<sup>1</sup> The Commission’s usage of the terms *diversity management* and *diversity leadership* is explored further in the next section, “Definitions.”

- Consider “the benefits of conducting an annual conference attended by civilian military, active-duty and retired military, and corporate leaders on diversity, to include a review of current policy and the annual demographic data from the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute and the Defense Manpower Data Center.”

As part of its examination of accountability and monitoring mechanisms, the subcommittee considered the benefits of a conference of this type.

In addition, a Legal Subcommittee was formed, not to respond to a charter task but to address legal aspects of increasing demographic diversity in the Armed Forces and to ensure that the Commission’s recommendations complied with the law.

## **Implementation and Accountability Strategic Goals and Concerns**

The I&A Subcommittee addressed diversity management plans and policies and focused on the organization—DoD and the Services. As the subcommittee grappled with the wide-ranging topics in its charter tasks, it identified these overarching goals:

- Devise an institutional structure that involves top leadership and holds leaders accountable for successful implementation of diversity management policies.
- Ensure a broadly diverse senior leadership through a strategic effort across personnel functions and throughout careers.
- Institute policies that are clear, are robust, and embed reporting and accountability.

The I&A and Legal Subcommittees distinguished seven strategic concerns that had to be addressed if the goals were to be achieved; these were based on an analysis of information that they received over the course of FY 2009–FY 2010:

1. the necessity for leadership involvement in increasing racial and ethnic minority and female representation among leadership
2. the need for a strategic diversity effort across personnel functions and throughout careers
3. a process for infusing appreciation of, and respect for, diversity, broadly defined, throughout the organization
4. an understanding of the connection between diversity and mission effectiveness
5. the requirement for clear, robust policy with embedded reporting and accountability
6. ways in which to ensure policy adherence
7. the need for diversity-related policies and procedures to be closely aligned with current law.

These areas of concern led directly to the identification of the recommendations listed below.

## **Commission-Approved Recommendations Related to Implementation and Accountability<sup>2</sup>**

Based on its understanding of current implementation and accountability practices and the information presented in the following sections of this paper, the Commission makes the following recommendations. These recommendations are based on the Commission's broad definition of diversity, yet keep a strong focus on racial and ethnic minorities and women. Furthermore, these recommendations recognize the inevitable increase in demographic diversity in DoD and are intended to help DoD harness that diversity and make it a force multiplier.

### ***Recommendation 1—***

***1. The leadership of DoD and the Services must personally commit to making diversity an institutional priority.***

***2. The OSD organizational structure must be aligned to ensure a sustained focus on diversity and diversity initiatives and should include establishment of the position of Chief Diversity Officer who reports directly to the Secretary of Defense.***

***3. DoD and the Services must institute clear, robust diversity policies with emphasis on roles, responsibilities, authorities, and accountability (R2A2).***

- ***a. DoD and the Services shall revise and/or reissue and enforce compliance with their diversity and equal opportunity policies.***
- ***b. Diversity policies at all levels should be implemented via strategic plans and within a life-cycle framework.***

### ***Recommendation 2—***

***DoD and the Services should adjust their organizational cultures to inculcate a broader understanding of the various types of diversity by***

- ***a. incorporating diversity leadership skills and respect for diversity into training and education throughout career development***
- ***b. identifying and rewarding the skills needed to meet the operational challenges of the 21st century***
- ***c. using strategic communications plans to communicate their diversity vision and values.***

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<sup>2</sup> The recommendations discussed in this decision paper are the Commission-approved, topic-specific recommendations that resulted from the Commission's understanding and interpretation of the findings from this subcommittee. Following the approval of all of the subcommittee-specific recommendations, the Commission developed its final recommendations by combining recommendations across subcommittees to reduce overlap and repetition. Therefore, the recommendations presented in this paper do not map directly to the recommendations presented in the Commission's forthcoming final report.

**Recommendation 3—**

**DoD should institute mechanisms for accountability and internal and external monitoring at OSD and Service levels, including the Reserve Component, by**

- **a. embedding diversity leadership in performance assessment throughout careers**
- **b. establishing diversity leadership as a criterion for nomination and appointment to senior enlisted leadership positions and Flag and General officers, including 3-star and 4-star positions and Service Chief.**
  - **i. Formalize the process and requirements for 3- and 4-star selection in the DoD Instruction 1320.4, Military Officer Actions Requiring Approval of the Secretary of Defense or the President, or Confirmation by the Senate.**
  - **ii. Include diversity leadership statement in SASC questionnaire.**
- **c. transferring the functions of the former Defense Equal Opportunity Council (DEOC) to a minimum of biannual meetings of DoD’s leadership, the existing Defense Advisory Working Group (DAWG)**
- **d. instituting a system of “accountability reviews” that is driven by the Secretary of Defense**
- **e. directing “Research and Analysis” office to support the Chief Diversity Officer**
- **f. expanding the DACOWITS charter, where appropriate, to encompass diversity as a whole.**

**Organization of This Paper**

By assembling and reviewing what the I&A Subcommittee found in pursuit of improving diversity management in the military, the Commission hopes to provide guidance on measures to ensure effective implementation and accountability of DoD’s diversity efforts.

This decision paper begins with a section providing important background information: definitions of key terms, a list of working assumptions that underlie the recommendations, a brief description of the legal context for diversity, and a short account of how best practices in the private sector were used as reference points throughout the I&A Subcommittee’s work. The remaining sections of the decision paper discuss each recommendation in turn.

## BACKGROUND INFORMATION

### Definitions of Relevant Terms

The lack of widely accepted definitions for common diversity-related terms creates confusion, masks disagreement, and limits mutual understanding. In this paper and throughout its work, the Commission makes use of several key terms. Understanding the differences among these will illuminate the scope of the Commission's work and the recommendations at which it arrived.

#### Diversity

The Commission developed the following definition of *diversity* to use for its work and to recommend to DoD: *Diversity is all the different characteristics and attributes of individuals that are consistent with Department of Defense core values, are integral to mission readiness and accomplishment, and reflect the country we serve.*

The importance of this definition is that it defines diversity as the broad set of differences that individuals bring to the military, not just a subset of demographic differences. It thus reflects the empirical evidence that multiple aspects of difference between people are relevant for organizational performance and capability.<sup>3</sup>

When this decision paper uses this definition, it refers to diversity, broadly defined (or, simply, diversity). Otherwise, the term is qualified with adjectives, such as demographic diversity or structural diversity.

#### Diversity Management

The Commission understands *diversity management* to be about how organizations drive or affect the impact of diversity on key organizational outcomes. Diversity management has three components:

- *Plans.* Organization-level strategic plans identify goals and strategies that tie diversity management to the overall mission.
- *Policies.* Organization-level policies define the parameters for action and behavior.
- *Practices.* Individual organization members, especially leaders, leverage diversity in service of the mission.

Diversity management is thus about managing how human differences affect organizational capability, whether differences refer to demographics, cognitive types and skills, place in the organizational structure, or identity within the broader global community. Therefore, the characteristics and purpose of diversity management are very different from those of EO.

The Commission understands EO to be compliance with laws that protect members of certain classes from discrimination (e.g., men and women as different members of the gender class; and whites, blacks, and Hispanics as different members of the race and ethnicity classes). This includes ensuring that decisions related to hiring, promotion, and separation are made on the basis of qualifications and performance, not membership in a protected class.

In contrast, *diversity management* addresses a full range of demographic differences, not just the subset protected by law, as well as other nondemographic differences that are also not subject to legal

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<sup>3</sup> The Commission's recommended definition of diversity is discussed in detail in Decision Paper #5.

protection. The Commission heard ample evidence that in private sector organizations, and the Services themselves, diversity goals are improved organizational outcomes. Even when the focus is on demographically underrepresented groups, diversity goals are organizational, such as reducing turnover or accessing particular markets more effectively. For instance, the Services speak specifically about the role of racial and ethnic diversity in winning the war for talent.

## Diversity Leadership

For the Commission, *diversity leadership* is a subset of diversity management as defined above, specifically the practices subset.<sup>4</sup> Diversity leadership addresses how leaders at all ranks and organizational levels shape the impact of diversity dynamics (i.e., the group dynamics that arise specifically as a result of group diversity<sup>5</sup>) in the forces under their command.

Diversity leadership refers to specific leadership practices at the group level, whether the groups are small or large—wherever people interact to achieve an outcome. Thus, it refers to how leaders influence the ways in which people and groups under their command relate to one another.

## Inclusion

Researchers have developed many definitions of *inclusion* to guide their investigations.<sup>6</sup> The Commission used several of these definitions to develop an operating definition of inclusion for its work: An inclusive culture is one in which individuals of all backgrounds experience a sense of belonging and experience their uniqueness as being valued. With effective diversity leadership, in a culture of inclusion, the diversity of knowledge and perspectives that members of different groups bring to the organization shapes how the work is done.

## Working Assumptions

- Diversity management and leadership benefit all and are increasingly important to mission accomplishment.
- Diversity and EO are linked, but diversity is not EO.
  - Diversity has four components: demographic, structural, cognitive, and global.
  - EO is the law and addresses demographic diversity and protected classes.
- Diversity is a fact of life.
  - It must be managed and led.
- EO is a desired state.
  - It must be monitored and enforced.
- Equal opportunity is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for diversity management and the creation of an inclusive environment.
- OSD and Service Secretaries are responsible for policy and oversight.

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<sup>4</sup> See Decision Paper #6. Because the military calls people management practices “leadership” (i.e., the military “manages” resources but “leads” people), the Diversity Leadership Subcommittee interpreted its task as addressing effective and accountable leadership of diverse groups and developing leaders at all levels to provide such leadership.

<sup>5</sup> Group dynamics are commonly understood as the processes by which group members interact and influence each other’s behavior and, therefore, the group’s performance. These processes include norms, roles, relations, development, need to belong, and social influence, and they affect how members communicate, cooperate, and develop the trust needed to achieve the group’s purpose.

<sup>6</sup> See Holvino et al., 2004; Miller, 1998; and Roberson, 2006.

- Services adhere to and execute in accordance with policy and guidance.

## Legal Context<sup>7</sup>

The U.S. military has limited flexibility in designing programs to increase the demographic diversity of its members and, ultimately, its senior leadership. Specifically, the law limits the military's ability to adopt policies that apply different standards in admission, accession, assignment, promotion, or separation decisions based on an individual's race, color, ethnicity, gender, or religion. The law is the product of the nation's history of invidious discrimination. Because of this history, federal law prohibits intentional and unintentional discrimination against employees based on these characteristics. Courts require that employers clearly demonstrate that any use of different standards based on these categories in employment decisionmaking is done for a legitimate, necessary purpose and not to invidiously discriminate. Two bodies of law govern the use of race, ethnicity, color, national origin, gender, and religion in the context of employment by the government: (1) the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (U.S. Constitution, 1868) and the cases interpreting it and (2) several statutes, of which the most relevant to the military in the current context is Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (as amended; 42 U.S. Code 2000e [2009]).

Current law forbids invidious discrimination, but it also makes it difficult for the military to make distinctions based on the above categories for benevolent purposes. The military is, however, something of an exception among public employers because it has been granted unusual flexibility to discriminate based on age and disability and, to a very limited extent, gender, based on current perceptions of military requirements.

There are, however, efforts that the military can undertake to increase its demographic diversity that do not carry a high risk of being successfully challenged in court. For example, programs that do not use different decisionmaking standards based on the categories set forth above do not face the same limits or risks that accompany programs explicitly based on membership in one or more suspect classes. Therefore, a program that ensures that recruiting resources are directed to historically low recruitment areas, that helps improve the qualifications of applicants, or that finds and then removes barriers to equal opportunity will face a lower level of (or no) litigation risk. In contrast, policies that use different standards in accession, admission, assignment, promotion, and separation decisionmaking based on suspect class membership are not likely to pass legal muster without a very strong justification and very careful program design.

## An Unclear Area of Law

It is important to recognize that the law in this area suffers from significant confusion and contradiction. There are several reasons for this, many of which are rooted in the politics of the segregation era and in typical characteristics of the judicial process.

First, the relevant bodies of law were created to end explicit segregation and discrimination, which makes them an awkward fit in modern efforts to increase demographic diversity. Second, the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment gives no guidance beyond guaranteeing the equal protection of the laws. All interpretations of this text are made by judges as they preside over an adversarial process.

Third, judges make decisions in each individual case based on the particular facts and arguments of that case. The cases that are ruled on by the Supreme Court or courts of appeal often involve

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<sup>7</sup> A series of four issue papers covers key aspects of the law as it applies to demographic diversity programs (Issue Papers #35, #36, #37, and #51).

unusual facts or particularly poorly designed policies, and this has resulted in a body of law that is presented as being general but is actually based on marginal cases. Most Supreme Court decisions in this field are not unanimous, with many recent decisions having been decided by a 5–4 majority.<sup>8</sup>

Fourth, litigation is literally trial and error. Some programs that were struck down in the past might now or in the future likely be upheld (or vice versa) based on successful arguments used in other, later cases; in front of other judges; or with the benefit of new evidence from the social sciences.

Fifth, judges are human and fallible. Judges may make their rulings based on their perceptions or presumptions. They may be friendly or hostile to demographic diversity or affirmative action programs as a matter of principle. Judges of different viewpoints may replace these judges when they retire (as happened, for example, when Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor retired).

In sum, it is extremely difficult to predict whether a particular good-faith policy or program designed to further demographic diversity will pass Constitutional muster. However, the Commission believes that its recommendations do fall within the current legal framework.

## Learning from the Private Sector

To derive insight into how to manage diversity in the military, it helps to have a basis of comparison. As recognized by the charter task “Consider the incorporation of private sector practices successful in cultivating diverse leadership,” private sector organizations can provide that comparison. Many corporations have been actively involved in efforts to manage diversity, using a wide variety of initiatives. Although private sector organizations differ from the military Services in several key respects, much still can be learned from them that may prove useful to DoD and the Services.

The I&A Subcommittee sponsored two issue papers devoted to diversity management initiatives in the private sector:

- One examined preemployment and externally oriented initiatives (Issue Paper #48). The practices discussed there are most relevant to the Outreach and Recruiting Subcommittee.
- The second adopted an internal focus, examining efforts aimed within organizations—such as various practices and approaches used by individual leaders and internal company policies and programs (Issue Paper #49).

The practices described in the issue papers have been cited as exemplary in that they were included in one or more of the following lists: “The 40 Best Companies for Diversity” (*Black Enterprise Magazine*, 2009), “The Top 50 Companies for Diversity” (Frankel, 2010), and “100 Best Companies to Work For—Top Companies: Most Diverse” (*Fortune Magazine*, 2010). Note that the exact criteria of effectiveness used in these lists were not always exactly specified. The practices reported here are illustrative of ones used by companies considered good with respect to managing diversity and do not claim to possess scientific validity.

In addition, the Commission as a whole learned of best practices directly from diversity managers, academic experts, and others associated with diversity efforts at its April and June 2010 meetings. The Commission took briefings and hosted two panel discussions featuring diversity

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<sup>8</sup> The Supreme Court has ruled 5–4 in most recent cases involving diversity issues, such as *Ricci et al. v. DeStefano et al.*, 129 S.Ct. 2658 (2009); *Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1*, 551 U.S. 701 (2007); *Gratz v. Bollinger*, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); and *Grutter v. Bollinger*, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). For earlier cases, see Spann, 2000, pp. 162–163.

managers from corporations recognized for excellence in this sphere. One panel featured the defense industry, with representatives from Lockheed Martin, General Dynamics, Raytheon, and Northrop Grumman. The information gained informed the Commission's recommendations; however, the differences between the private sector and the military may constrain the applicability of private sector practices. Although the Commission observes those constraints during this review, it encourages all to think broadly and to push back against the walls that form the "comfort zone" of "that's the way we've always done it."

## RECOMMENDATION 1

### ***Recommendation 1—***

#### ***The leadership of DoD and the Services must personally commit to making diversity an institutional priority.***

The primary takeaway from private sector practices is that the leadership must personally and visibly lead the diversity effort. Understanding diversity and diverse groups is a key element of the successful leader's tool kit, at all levels.

### **Lessons from the Private Sector**

The importance of personal leadership from the top was the number one finding in a 1999 study of diversity best practices. This study was co-led by the Commerce Department and Vice President Gore's Reinventing Government initiative:

Managers manage change, but best-in-class leaders create change by inspiring their employees. Our partners champion diversity by infusing it into all organizational processes and ensuring that diversity is integrated into the core values of the organization. They recognize diversity as an important goal, and position the responsibility for diversity not merely with human resources departments or diversity offices, but with top-level and senior executives. Our best-in-class leaders provide the visibility and commit the time and resources to make diversity happen. In short, diversity is both a top priority and a personal responsibility for these leaders. (U.S. Department of Commerce and Vice President Al Gore's National Partnership for Reinventing Government, n.d.)

The same point was made in an April 2010 address to the Commission. A pioneer in the field of diversity management, Dr. R. Roosevelt Thomas, described CEO involvement as a prerequisite for success:

[T]he leadership function for me tends to be around the strategic planning level, and here I mean the strategic planning level, not just with respect to diversity management, but with respect to overall strategy. So, my job as a leader is to make certain that . . . we have a diversity management mission and vision and strategy that supports our overall vision, mission, and strategy, and not only does that happen, I take responsibility as leader to embed this into the organization, and I am also responsible for the culture of the organization as leader. . . . I provide the context for managerial action, and managerial action is around the day-to-day implementation, but if that leadership function is not there and it's not always there. . . . I spoke to a CEO not long ago, "What are you trying to do with your diversity, your new diversity initiative?" And he started stuttering. He said, "Well, I, I, I, well, well, but we will see, but I am committed." And the diversity council was moving forward on his

commitment, but what I wanted to say to the diversity council [was that] you need to stop and get grounded in what is his commitment because you are chasing a rabbit that hasn't been defined and you are not going to get it. (Thomas, 2010)

Also at the April 2010 Commission meeting, the panel heard from the leadership of Sodexo, the company ranked number one by DiversityInc in 2010. Dr. Rohini Anand, Sodexo's global chief diversity officer and senior vice president, talked about personal commitment from her chief executive officer (CEO):

Our executive team is very committed, visibly committed. . . . We had a diversity leadership council meeting on Monday in the afternoon. And our CEO came from a PR [public relations] training . . . he walked into the Diversity Leadership Council meeting, and the first thing he said was, . . . he was asked to talk about . . . three topics, and one of those three topics was on diversity, and he said that he is so comfortable talking about diversity that he had a lot to say with a lot of passion. And the person who was training him said, "Well, you know, pick a couple of items to talk about, but can you get to sort of the same level of passion in some of the other topics that you are talking about?" (Anand, 2010)

Michael Montelongo, Sodexo's senior vice president and chief administrative officer, made a similar point:

[P]art of getting there is, as I mentioned before (and Rohini has actually emphasized several times), is if your senior leadership declares this as key to its success and that the key leaders, the top leaders are going to actively, not passively, but actively manage the process. (Montelongo, 2010)

Luke Visconti, CEO of DiversityInc, supported the points made by Anand and Montelongo:

The first and most effective thing in any organization's desire to manage diversity is clear-cut support from the senior leader. It does not happen without that. I recently responded to a question in my column where a person asked, "Have you ever seen a case where it percolates up from the staff?" And I said, "In ten years of doing this, of measuring this, ten years, never seen one example of that." It must come from the CEO, without CEO support, unequivocal, strong, and I have a whole slide on leadership by the way coming up, it will not happen. (Visconti, 2010)

In his briefing slides, paraphrased below, Visconti (2010) listed five characteristics of diversity leadership from the top and gave an example of each:<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> In this context, diversity leadership refers to the role that top leadership plays in influencing the success or failure of diversity-related policies and programs. This is conceptually different from the diversity leadership addressed by the Diversity Leadership Subcommittee, which addressed practices from the bottom up as they are applied to diverse workgroups—specifically, how leaders at all levels actually lead diverse groups effectively and how leaders at all levels are developed to provide such leadership.

- Visible: Others must see, hear, and understand your values and commitment.
  - Half of Kaiser Permanente’s board of directors are black, Asian, and Latino; and 36 percent are women.
  - 32 percent of Kaiser Permanente’s CEO and direct reports level [employees] are black, Asian, and Latino; and 32 percent are women.
- Specific: Tangible goals, specific rewards/repercussions.
  - At IBM, every employee has a personal business commitment (PBC), a contract to perform and reach goals upon which compensation is based. For executives, bonuses are based on three specific factors: the company’s overall financial performance, their business unit’s financial performance, and how the executives have achieved their diversity goals.
- Personal: Discusses his or her own values with a little personal history.
  - “My [college] roommate was the first African American I ever met and I was kind of taken aback. I had never actually spent much time with an African American, but Willie and I became the best of friends, and suddenly, I realized there was a whole breadth of experience and talent and capabilities that I had never been exposed to, and it was a very eye-opening experience” (Randall L. Stephenson, chairman and CEO of AT&T, in an interview with DiversityInc CEO Luke Visconti).
- Persistent: Not just special occasions.
  - J. W. (Bill) Marriott, Jr., chairman and CEO of Marriott International, blogs about his personal and company commitment to diversity, such as his recent decision to oppose his Mormon Church on same-sex marriage.
- Intentional: “This is what I want to happen and this is the deadline.”
  - George Chavel, CEO of Sodexo, puts aside a fund that is just for diversity bonuses (the only fund at the company that can’t be impacted by financial performance). (Visconti, 2010)

A previous review of best practices summarizes the key point:

Senior leadership commitment in both word and action was the most commonly cited key to success mentioned in the Task Group’s best-practices interviews. Interviewees were adamant that the *Chief Executive Officer’s (CEO’s) leadership must be visible to the whole organization, that it must be plain-spoken, clear, convincing, frequent and supported by action.* The CEO must incorporate this commitment into the corporate strategy, culture and values. (Defense Business Board, 2004, emphasis added)

## U.S. Military

How do these practices compare with those of the U.S. military? Currently, one Service Chief has announced, unequivocally, that he will lead diversity initiatives:

- Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Diversity Policy (Roughead, n.d.): “As the Chief of Naval Operations, I will lead diversity initiatives in the Navy. I challenge all who serve to do the same through leadership, mentorship, service, and example” (Gary Roughead).

Other Service Chiefs and Secretaries have made statements on diversity, but these are either not clearly tied to diversity or fall short of taking personal responsibility for leading the effort.

- Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard Diversity Policy Statement (Papp, n.d.): “I am personally committed to making the Coast Guard the Service of choice for all Americans who seek to serve our Nation and its people” (R. J. Papp, Jr.).
- Marine Corps Diversity Policy (Conway, n.d.): “I expect all who serve together as part of our Marine Corps to respect and value each individual” (James T. Conway).
- Army Diversity Policy (signed by Secretary, Chief of Staff, Sergeant Major of the Army; U.S. Department of the Army, 2009): “We expect all leaders to develop and maintain an inclusive environment that will sustain the Army as a relevant and ready force. We share in this commitment as a team” (Pete Geren, George W. Casey, Jr., Kenneth O. Preston).
- Chief of Staff of the Air Force: No policy statement.
- Secretary of the Air Force letter to airmen (Donley, 2009): “Each of us brings a rich heritage, unique experience and compelling personal story—and we are proud of that diversity. As we join together in public service, I encourage you to learn from each other and draw from the unique strengths that your teammates bring to our Service and the Nation” (Michael B. Donley).
- Secretary of Defense: No policy statement.

Besides the testimony from leaders known for diversity in the private sector, the Commission cites the Navy’s example. Among the Services, the Navy stands out—both for its recent results in increasing demographic diversity and for the CNO’s personal and visible commitment to diversity.<sup>10</sup> In contrast, at OSD, the I&A Subcommittee did not find evidence that diversity has been a visible priority of leadership.<sup>11</sup>

Lim et al. (2008) emphasize the importance of the Secretary of Defense’s leadership in achieving diversity goals in DoD: “The personal involvement of the Secretary of Defense provides a clear signal to the workforce that managing diversity and ensuring that it is a core value of the department is a top priority. This involvement is essential to bring about the institutional changes necessary to achieve greater diversity.”

The commitment by the Secretary of Defense should be reflected in the statements and behaviors of the leaders of the military departments and the Services. Each leader must subscribe to the same clear vision for the organization, because these leaders will be communicating the vision to all members in the organization. Business management literature on managing change calls for the creation of a guiding coalition to generate the motivation to change within the workforce (Issue Paper #21). To achieve change throughout the organization, it is important that the individuals who will be developing, implementing, and maintaining change constantly reinforce each other.

Leaders must also model the change that is desired; if a leader’s actions are viewed as contrary to the initiative, the workforce will no longer believe in the value of change and will lose mission focus.

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<sup>10</sup> See, for example, Barrett, 2009, and Roughead, 2010.

<sup>11</sup> Besides the lack of personal statements from the Secretary, DoD has no strategic plan to guide the Services’ diversity efforts, and, for the most part, the Services were ahead of DoD in policy development, issuing policy statements with embedded diversity definitions and diversity management goals at different points since 2006 (Issue Paper #20). In addition, several aspects of DoD’s EO policies have been allowed to lapse, including the Human Goals Charter, the Military Equal Opportunity Assessment (MEOA), and the Defense Equal Opportunity Council (DEOC), all addressed later in this decision paper. See also the discussion of OSD’s organizational structure for diversity under Recommendation 2, below.

It is the leaders' responsibility to understand their roles, communicate the new vision, lead by example, and develop buy-in from members of the organization.

The Commission believes that successful leadership of an increasingly diverse DoD is a force multiplier. Failure of leadership will suboptimize force capability and adversely affect mission accomplishment. A final quotation from the private sector sums up the Commission's thinking about the centrality of personal leadership:

[T]he whole issue of making sure that those at the very senior ranks, the flags and the SESs,<sup>12</sup> are absolutely, unequivocally committed to this. And so much so, that they make it a priority of the particular service strategy. It can't be something that is an ad hoc bolt-on, it can't be something that's done part time. It actually is something that's called out as part of the individual service branch strategy. (Montelongo, 2010)

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<sup>12</sup> Members of the Senior Executive Service (SES) are the civilian equivalents of flag/general officers within DoD.

## RECOMMENDATION 2

### ***Recommendation 2—***

***The OSD organizational structure must be aligned to ensure a sustained focus on diversity and diversity initiatives and should include establishment of the position of Chief Diversity Officer, who reports directly to the Secretary of Defense.***

The institutional structure is another important factor in the effectiveness of the diversity effort. In OSD, diversity management is consigned to an understaffed office several levels below the Secretary of Defense. In the military departments and the Services, placement of the diversity offices varies considerably, as does their effectiveness. The Commission believes that a systems approach is needed to ensure the sustained emphasis on diversity that several speakers and Commissioners agreed has been lacking in the past.<sup>13</sup> Within that system, the establishment of a chief diversity officer is the key driver toward embedding diversity within the “DNA” of DoD and sustaining diversity efforts.

### **OSD Organization**

Currently, responsibility for diversity management in OSD is assigned to the Office of Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity (ODMEO). This office is charged with promoting EO throughout DoD and overseeing diversity policy for DoD, including coordinating the diversity efforts of the Services. The diversity mission was an added function initiated by ODMEO leadership to help the department incorporate diversity management practices and processes into its workforce management culture (Johnson, 2011).

ODMEO grew out of the Office of Deputy Under Secretary (EO) (DUSD[EO]), which was established under the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. DUSD(EO) was established in 2003, when the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Equal Opportunity was elevated to the position of DUSD(EO) and the position was filled by a political appointee. When that political appointee departed in 2006, the office of the DUSD(EO) was renamed ODMEO and placed under the DUSD (Plans). On one hand, this realignment mainstreamed diversity and EO by integrating responsibility for these functions into the established organization responsible for “developing and implementing change in high priority areas within . . . Personnel and Readiness” (Undersecretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness, 2006). On the other hand, this change dealt two blows: demotion in status and loss of a political appointee position to set and carry out the agenda (Haughton, 2010). When diversity management was added to ODMEO’s functions, one existing position was realigned as diversity manager, but no new positions were created (Love, 2009). In 2010, the position of DUSD (Plans) was eliminated, and ODMEO was placed under the DUSD (Readiness).

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<sup>13</sup> See for example, remarks by Haughton (2010), Love (2010), and Lyles (2010) and the list of major reports described under Recommendation 5.

Although several key diversity initiatives have been undertaken, the diversity management function of ODMEO's portfolio has been slow in comprehensive progress (Johnson, 2011).<sup>14</sup> Today, ODMEO remains an understaffed office several levels below the Secretary.

## Service and Military Department Organization

In the military departments and the Services, the placement of, and funding and staffing for, the diversity offices varies considerably.<sup>15</sup> The Marine Corps and Navy each maintain a diversity office; the Secretary of the Navy has an advisor but no staff explicitly devoted to diversity *policy*. The Army's diversity office has moved from the Service to the Secretariat. The Air Force has both a diversity policy staff in the Secretariat and a diversity operations office in the Service. This model is something that the other Services may want to consider: a diversity policy and oversight office in the Secretariat and a diversity operations office in the Service. The vastly different scope and activities of diversity offices in the Navy and Marine Corps described in briefings to the Commission indicate a lack of overarching policy at the Service Secretary level.

Based on information provided by the Services' diversity managers, the following key factors are considered related to the diversity offices' effectiveness:

- *Routine access to leadership.* Although the top leadership must take ownership of the diversity effort, routine interaction of the diversity office with senior officers responsible for personnel functions is also required.
- *Access to organizations involved across the spectrum of personnel functions.* This wide reach enables the diversity office to advance an integrated agenda, to include recruiting, assignment, mentoring, training, and promotions.
- *Staff and funding.* The amounts needed to be effective will vary depending in part on the maturity of the effort, its ownership, and the extent of assimilation into routine functions throughout the Service's career life-cycle functions.

It is important to remember that the Services have a long and successful record of making their in-place infrastructure responsive to resolving and managing any given problem. However, it is also no secret that the speed and permanence of the solution is directly related to the emphasis and focus exerted by the senior leadership team. Toward that end, the service-unique structural alignment of these critical factors provides another opportunity to reinforce not just the importance but also the degree to which the senior leadership team must remain engaged to ensure unity of effort in achieving the department's diversity goals.

## Private Sector Organization

The Commission looked to industry to see how companies with exemplary diversity programs approach and organize for effective diversity management. In corporations, personal engagement from the CEO has been shown to be vital. In the U.S. military, the Secretary of Defense is analogous to the corporate CEO and, as such, should be responsible for pushing the department forward on the path to inclusion. He and his successors will, however, need help and continuity to enforce new

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<sup>14</sup> ODMEO's accomplishments include sponsoring a diversity summit, establishing the Defense Diversity Working Group (DDWG), and promulgating DoDD 1020.02, *Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity (EO) in the Department of Defense* (Issue Paper #7; Issue Paper #50; Lim et al., 2009).

<sup>15</sup> Transcripts of the March 2010 Service briefings to the Commission are available at Military Leadership Diversity Commission (2010).

policies and ensure that progress continues to be made. The Commission believes that a systems approach is needed to ensure the sustained emphasis on diversity that has been lacking in the past. Within that system, the establishment of a chief diversity officer (CDO) is the key driver toward embedding diversity within the “DNA” of DoD.

What is a CDO? According to one diversity practitioner, the overarching role of the CDO is as a strategic business partner for others on the executive team. The CDO does not have operational authority per se and depends on others for execution of diversity initiatives. Thus, he or she partners with those heading up business divisions, “helping them develop strategy for their business units and making sure that they understand what the organization is doing and why, how results are measured, who is accountable” (Dexter, 2010).

Below is an example of the responsibilities of a corporate CDO:

[R]esponsible for developing business strategies focused on the needs of a diverse workforce, working closely with other members of Freddie Mac’s senior management team to ensure the company is effectively utilizing diverse talent (both within its employee base and its suppliers), enhance the annual diversity planning process and manage performance against the company’s diversity plans. (Freddie Mac, 2010)

Freddie Mac’s CDO reports directly to the CEO and is also charged with designing and launching an Executive Diversity Council, to be led jointly by the CDO and the CEO.

The Commission recommends that the Department of Defense CDO report directly to the Secretary of Defense (or CEO) and receive support from the Undersecretary of Defense (P&R) (analogous to a vice president of human resources). This practice is one way of ensuring that diversity management is embraced as a “line,” rather than “staff,” responsibility. In addition, this reporting relationship supports the goal of establishing diversity leadership as the CEO’s responsibility. It is also consistent with military staff organizations, which typically have a small number of individuals with responsibilities of such importance (e.g., safety) that the commander keeps them close.

The CDO cannot work in isolation, however. An integrated, holistic system to implementation and accountability is needed if progress is to be sustained. Figure 1 illustrates such an approach and reveals the centrality of the CDO to all facets of the system.

**Figure 1. The Centrality of the CDO Within the Proposed Diversity Management System**

The diversity management system is a set of mutually reinforcing elements that work together to provide effective, consistent implementation and persistent accountability for achieving diversity management goals. Note that all of these components have counterparts in best practices in the Services and/or the corporate world. The components are

- *Accountability reviews.* The Secretary of Defense meets annually with the leadership of each Service to go over progress toward diversity management goals (see Recommendation 5). This prepares him or her for the Diversity Annual Report to Congress, a recommendation discussed in Decision Paper #8.
- *Diversity Annual Report to Congress.* Called for in Recommendation 5, this report from the Secretary of Defense draws on the Services' accountability reviews to review DoD's progress toward its overarching diversity management goals.
- *Early warning/inspector general function.* The set of activities undertaken by the CDO provides the information needed to alert the Secretary of potential problems with diversity management progress, programs, or practices.
- *Diversity Policy Integration Group.* The CDO, acting as a strategic business partner, chairs a diversity policy integration group, through which OSD's policy offices take responsibility for implementation of diversity initiatives within their domains.
- *DAWG diversity sessions.* The Deputy's Advisory Working Group (DAWG), the existing senior DoD leadership forum, follows up in a regular meeting on overarching diversity management issues (see Recommendation 5).

The CDO is a critical player in implementing each of these components of the diversity management system. Some of these components are the subject of later recommendations and will be discussed there. The Diversity & Policy Integration Working Group is designed to integrate a diversity perspective into DoD policy. This group, chaired by the CDO, would consist of the Personnel and Readiness Deputy Under and Assistant Secretaries with policy responsibility for the primary components of the total force: Reserve Affairs, Civilian Personnel Policy, Military Personnel

Policy, and Readiness. This group would provide the CDO with access to policy offices that have not traditionally been involved with diversity management. Establishing this working group would facilitate the implementation of diversity management initiatives by using a “mainstreaming” approach to infuse a diversity perspective across the organization.

Thus, the CDO himself or herself would not be directly involved with implementation of diversity initiatives and programs but would have instead an oversight and early warning role. Implementation of diversity management initiatives would be carried out by P&R’s policy organizations (Reserve Affairs, Civilian Personnel Policy, Military Personnel Policy, and Readiness) and ultimately by the Services. The reallocation of responsibilities will help ensure that the policy organizations take full ownership of the diversity initiatives that are associated with their policy domains.

Another key role for the CDO is operating the DoD accountability reviews, described below in Recommendation 5d. In this area, responsibilities might include analyzing data, assembling evidence, preparing the Secretary of Defense, coordinating with the Services, attending each Service’s review, and monitoring compliance with directives.

In conjunction with the Research and Analysis office (see Recommendation 5e), the CDO would also

- oversee a strategic study plan on diversity management to avoid fragmentation of effort and to ensure focus on priorities
- gather and analyze information on total force integration and diversity leadership
- provide critical indicators and identify potential trouble spots across the total force.

Recommendations that follow explain the remaining functions and activities that make up the recommended diversity management system.

## RECOMMENDATION 3

### ***Recommendation 3—***

#### ***DoD and the Services must institute clear, robust diversity policies with emphasis on roles, responsibilities, authorities, and accountability.***

Diversity management policies and plans are the third key piece of implementation. Good policies are clear, specify responsibilities and authorities, and embed monitoring and accountability. They are required for institutionalization. Currently, the Services' diversity policy statements say nice things about diversity but contain no specifics about execution, responsibilities, or content of programs. The DoD policy, DoD Directive 1020.02, provides a vision but is vague about implementation and contains no accountability mechanism (U.S. Department of Defense, 2009a). The Coast Guard has an official strategic plan with objectives, milestones, and metrics (U.S. Coast Guard, n.d.). The Air Force released a Diversity Strategic Roadmap in November 2010 (Lyle, 2010).<sup>16</sup>

The other Services have pieces of plans, but they have not been synthesized and promulgated and do not provide a detailed, coordinated strategy for achieving their diversity visions. In addition, roles, responsibilities, authorities, and accountability have not been addressed in any coordinated fashion.

The overarching DoD policy pertaining to diversity management is DoD Directive 1020.02, *Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity in the Department of Defense*, from February 2009. The directive establishes “policy, assigns responsibilities, and provides an overarching framework for DoD Diversity, Military EO, and Civilian EEO programs” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2009a). Issue Paper #50 provides an assessment of the diversity management sections of this directive.

ODMEO does not have an approved strategic diversity plan. According to its March 2010 Commission briefing, ODMEO has a vision (maintain a diverse, mission-ready force), mission (create a 21st century corporate culture that values diversity and inclusion as a readiness imperative and strives for representational diversity at all levels through flag/general officer/SES to provide a competitive advantage in the war for talent), and five strategic goals to guide its diversity management activities. The office drafted a strategic plan with goals and objectives in 2004, but it has not been formalized or updated.

An examination of DoD Directive 1020.02 reveals gaps and problems with both diversity management and EO guidance. Furthermore, most Services have only very general diversity policy statements; more substantive policies that spell out roles, responsibilities, authorities, and accountability are generally lacking at DoD, military department, and Service levels. Both DoD and the Services need to strengthen and finalize their diversity management policies, some of which have been in draft for many years. Service policies will vary according to Service culture and practices, but DoD needs to provide a fleshed-out umbrella policy under which they can operate.

In addition, OSD should remedy some of the omissions of the past decade. Some important pieces of DoD EO policies have been allowed to lapse over the past decade.

Finally, Services should implement their diversity management plans under a strategic plan that addresses diversity concerns across the life cycle of the servicemember. Implementation of this plan

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<sup>16</sup> The I&A Subcommittee was unable to evaluate the roadmap within Commission timelines.

will be more likely if the early recommendation on realigning human capital management functions is enacted.

This decision paper next discusses the two courses of action the Commission is advocating as part of this overarching recommendation.

## Diversity Management Policies

### **Recommendation 3a—**

#### ***DoD and the Services shall revise and/or reissue and enforce compliance with their diversity and equal opportunity policies.***

DoD's diversity management policy is characterized by broad, aspirational statements that will make implementation difficult. Consider these quotations from DoD Directive 1020.02:

The DoD Diversity Management Program shall: *Encourage DoD organizations to value diversity*, thus establishing a DoD culture that values inclusion of all DoD personnel, military and civilian, as part of the DoD team and views diversity throughout the workforce as a potential force multiplier in DoD mission accomplishment. (U.S. Department of Defense, 2009a, 4c1)

*Ensure that all military and civilian personnel understand they are valued*; ensure they are able to achieve their full potential while contributing to accomplishment of the DoD mission. (U.S. Department of Defense, 2009a, 4c2)

What do these statements require in terms of actions? On the one hand, the lack of specifics allows customization by the Services. On the other, it establishes only a tenuous link between DoD's official diversity policy and the actions and oversight of its components. Is there any accountability embedded in DoD Directive 1020.02? It provides no clear accountability mechanism; however, it does require the services to report *something*: "Develop management systems that measure and report diversity management and EO progress" (U.S. Department of Defense, 2009a, 4c5).

The Services may find this task difficult to implement without additional guidance on how to report or measure diversity management—particularly aspects that go beyond demographics, which are more difficult to quantify. The Metrics Subcommittee addresses this problem in its decision paper (Decision Paper #8).

Existing Service diversity policy statements are, for the most part, short and general in nature (Issue Papers #3 and #20). This decision paper gave excerpts from each in the discussion of Recommendation 1.

One military department does have an instruction, which predates the DoD directive. This is SECNAV Instruction 5345.2, *Naval Equal Opportunity, Equal Employment Opportunity, and Diversity Oversight* (U.S. Department of the Navy, 2009). The instruction assigns roles and responsibilities for EO and diversity oversight to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (ASN [M&RA]), defines diversity, outlines a number of actions, and specifies required records management and reports. Although the definition provided is broad, the reporting and data collection seem confined to demographic dimensions. Again, direction for establishing effective and accountable diversity management, apart from EO, is not provided.

The Commission recommends that DoD and all military departments and Services issue new diversity policies that are clear, are action-oriented, and embed reporting requirements and accountability.

## Equal Opportunity Policies

In comparison to the relatively new domain of diversity management, the military already has several well-established and well-understood Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) policies, which apply to civilian employees, and Military Equal Opportunity (MEO) policies, which apply to uniformed personnel.

DoD Directive 1020.02 refers to four major EO directives: 5500.11 and 1020.1 on nondiscrimination, 1440.1 on DoD civilian EEO policies, and 1350.2 on MEO policies.

It also says that 1020.02 “consolidates” policies on EO and diversity but does not say explicitly that the EO policies are still in effect or are being reissued. Neither does it declare them superseded by 1020.02.

However, the understanding of individuals in ODMEO and former drafters of the policy is that these EO policies are in effect and will be reissued as instructions under the framework laid out in 1020.2. This has not yet happened.<sup>17</sup> Regardless, the Services and DoD are *not in compliance* with several crucial provisions expounded in the original EO policies: the Human Goals Charter, MEOA, and DEOC. The DEOC and MEOA are addressed elsewhere in this paper.

DoD Directive 1440.1 (U.S. Department of Defense, 1987) mandates that DoD “prepare a new DoD Human Goals Charter each time a new Secretary of Defense is appointed.” The last charter was signed in 1998 by then-Secretary of Defense William Cohen. The Human Goals Charter was not renewed by the George W. Bush administration and has not been renewed by the Obama administration.

In his presentation at the March 2010 Commission meeting, Claiborne Haughton, former Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Equal Opportunity, described the process for charter renewal and the clear signal it sends:

It must go out to all of the major elements of the Department of Defense and be coordinated and get their concurrence, including the general counsel, because, as I said, the signatories are the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the [S]ecretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Chiefs, and the DoD general counsel. Those are all the top leaders of that charter, and they must sign on to that charter before we can present it to the Secretary of Defense for signature, and so it is done that way each time that the new charter has been prepared and issued. And the wonderful thing about it is then we are authorized to make it a huge—it’s a one-page document, for example—a huge Styrofoam copy or a printed copy, a small copy, and you send them all over, and so when you walk into federal agencies you will see where they have maybe a picture of the president or the agency chief on the wall when you first walk in, well then, most of the DoD [offices] back in that period, they would get

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<sup>17</sup> Consistent with its oversight responsibilities, OSD is in the process of drafting implementing instructions (U.S. Department of Defense Office of Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity, Director, Military Equal Opportunity, personal communication, May 24, 2010).

the charter. It's [in the] EEO office and the commander's office, different places like that, so they are clear that this is the policy and practice of the Department of Defense, and what I really love about it is it allows new political executives and new military leaders . . . to get a briefing on why should they sign that charter. They are briefed on what it is. They know what they are signing up to and they get a clear statement of the vision upfront. (Haughton, 2010)

He also noted another provision of DoD EO policy that is no longer published: the MEOA. This report is described in DoD Directive 1350.2 (and expanded on in DoD Instruction 1350.3). It requires each DoD component to submit an annual MEOA that reports on, among other things, demographic differences in promotions, retention, and assignments. This was the sole reporting mechanism required from the Services on their affirmative action and EO policies. The requirement for the report is still on the books, but the MEOA was last produced in 2004, using FY 2002 data (U.S. Department of Defense, 2004).

The Commission recommends that DoD revise, reissue, comply with, and enforce its EO policies under the DoD Directive 1020.02 umbrella, to include the Human Goals Charter and a revamped MEOA. Rather than being a compilation of Service reports, the MEOA should be a central section of the annual accountability reviews described in Recommendation 5d. The report should be produced by the CDO's research and analysis organization, based on standardized data submitted by all Services to the Defense Manpower Data Center.

## Strategic Plans

### ***Recommendation 3b—***

#### ***Diversity policies at all levels should be implemented via strategic plans and within a life-cycle framework.***

To implement diversity policies, OSD and the Services need to produce detailed strategic plans that preclude piecemeal efforts and provide an integrated approach to diversity management. Each plan should provide a diversity vision and realistically acknowledge the long road ahead to harvest a demographically diverse leadership that also represents the mix of skills needed to meet the operational challenges of the 21st century. The strategic plans should include relevant metrics, milestones, and reporting requirements and should also identify the accountable leader for each milestone.

The Coast Guard has such a plan and has made it public and accessible (U.S. Coast Guard, n.d.); however, the plan is primarily confined to demographic aspects of diversity. The Air Force recently released a diversity strategic roadmap (U.S. Air Force, 2010).<sup>18</sup> Other Services have drafted plans or strategies, but they have not been published. For example, the Army Diversity Office is awaiting approval of its draft diversity strategy, which lays out strategic outcomes, goals, and major objectives. The goals are in line with the broad vision and policy statement on diversity. They indicate that the Army views diversity as something greater than racial, ethnic, and gender representation and that it is crafting a way forward with the end state of inclusion in mind.

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<sup>18</sup> The Air Force roadmap was not available in time to inform this decision paper.

## Strategic Life-Cycle Framework

A second way to ensure comprehensive diversity management programs is to make the plans reach strategically across the life cycle of the servicemember, from recruiting to training, branching, assignment, education, retention, promotion, and command—throughout individuals' careers. Once a demographically diverse group is attracted, the path laid out for their advancement should extend the same deliberate planning to every servicemember, whatever his or her race, gender, ethnicity, assigned career field, or component. This requirement meshes with projected operational needs and has been explored by the Branching and Assignments Subcommittee. Flag/general officer billets and the processes for filling them should be continuously reexamined to ensure that the range of expertise needed will be available at the highest levels.

To make their way successfully, individuals from minority groups—be they racial or ethnic minorities, women, or members of new career fields—will need mentoring, also a concern of the Branching and Assignments and Promotion Subcommittees. Access to mentoring may vary across accession sources. Programs should be instituted to ensure that effective mentoring is as available to Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) candidates as to academy cadets. To supplement mentoring, the Services should consider making more slots in the upwardly mobile careers available to ROTC; this change would provide more opportunity for minorities, as proportionally more minorities enter the Service through ROTC than through the academies (see Decision Paper #2). In addition, attention should be paid to finding and mentoring minorities entering through Officer Training School and Officer Candidate School. These individuals have proven success in college and may represent an especially fruitful use of recruiting resources. Finally, as individuals advance through their careers, key billets, opportunities for professional military education (PME; especially joint PME), and graduate education programs should likewise be equally available to all and extended to those in nontactical occupations, again facilitated through mentoring and monitoring.

## RECOMMENDATION 4

### ***Recommendation 4—***

#### ***DoD and the Services should adjust their organizational cultures to inculcate a broader understanding of the various types of diversity.***

There are several features that are core to an institution's culture: what is valued, what is inculcated through indoctrination and education, and what is rewarded. This recommendation addresses those features.

While the Armed Forces are celebrated for successes in achieving racial and ethnic diversity over the past 60 years, and a recent DoD instruction (U.S. Department of Defense, 2009b) prohibits servicemembers from actively advocating supremacist ideology or causes, respect for diversity is not in most cases called out as an explicit core value. The exception is the Coast Guard, which leads off its paragraph about the core value of respect in this way: "We value our diverse work force (U.S. Coast Guard Academy, n.d.)."

Respect for diversity is addressed in other places, such as the Army field manual on leadership (U.S. Army, 2006) and in DoD's Human Goals charter (U.S. Department of Defense, 1998). Consider this quotation from the Human Goals Charter:

In all that we do, we must show respect for the serviceman, the servicewoman, the civilian employee, and family members, recognizing their individual needs, aspirations, and capabilities. . . . We [must] strive:  
. . .

TO assure that equal opportunity programs are an integral part of readiness;

TO make military service in the Department of Defense a model of equal opportunity for all regardless of race, color, sex, religion or national origin;

TO create an environment that values diversity and fosters mutual respect and cooperation among all persons.

Thus, although respect for diversity is addressed in a piecemeal way, within DoD it is not an explicit core value.<sup>19</sup> Similarly, diversity leadership (i.e., leadership of diverse groups, as defined earlier) is not a core competency. Diversity leadership is not incorporated into PME, and informational meetings with servicemembers revealed that while most had had training in EO, they reported having little to no formal training on diversity or how to lead a diverse group of individuals (Issue Paper #18).

Further, there are no incentives for diversity-related accomplishments, nor is diversity leadership considered important in performance assessments or promotions (again, the Coast Guard is an exception).

<sup>19</sup> Recall that the Human Goals Charter has not been renewed since 1998.

Perhaps most important, the connection between diversity and mission effectiveness is not generally understood. Operational command culture does not always recognize the value of diversity, broadly defined, or consider diversity leadership skills as mission essential and crucial to unit cohesion. For example, requirements for future operations, such as those laid out in the *Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report* (U.S. Department of Defense, 2010), involve a wider set of skills than the traditional tactical/operational occupations alone. These have not, however, always been recognized as an important ingredient in the mix of skills required among top leadership (see Decision Paper #6).<sup>20</sup>

Changing the culture and broadening the understanding of diversity are concerns shared with the Diversity Leadership and National Guard and Reserve Subcommittees. The I&A Subcommittee drew from some of their ideas to develop the three parts of this recommendation.

## Core Value

### ***Recommendation 4a—***

#### ***Incorporating diversity leadership skills and respect for diversity into training and education throughout career development***

Core values are unchanging foundational principles that guide how people in an organization will conduct their everyday business (see Collins & Porras, 1996, and Lencioni, 2002, for example, for definitions of organizational core values). An organization's core values do not require external justification. They are the internal structure that underlies interactions among its members and that guides the strategies that the organization will employ to fulfill its mission. Ultimately, they motivate how the organization works and give a shared identity to people belonging to it.

Appreciation and respect for diversity needs to become an integral part of what it means to be a U.S. servicemember. More is required than simply revising a statement of values. For this to take root, a strategic approach is required. Exposure to core values begins with recruitment, is forged at boot camp/officer induction training, and is reinforced throughout a career, both in PME and in the unit.

Business practices for “managing change” could provide a framework for systematically implementing the culture change recommended by the Commission (Issue Paper #21). Business management specialists have developed a three-phase system of introducing, encouraging, and locking in new behaviors and procedures that will support an organization's new vision.

## Core Competency

The Diversity Leadership Subcommittee's decision paper describes in depth the concept of diversity leadership and its importance as a core competency. The I&A Subcommittee also addressed this concept to emphasize the importance—for both internal unit cohesion and operational effectiveness—of developing skills in leading diverse groups. The connection between diversity leadership, cross-cultural competency, and mission success must be clearly established and communicated.

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<sup>20</sup> One exception is the increased prominence of special forces in current military operations and now in leadership positions. Members of the special forces in several services have been chosen for top leadership assignments that are much broader in scope than their core area of expertise.

In addition, at the highest ranks of the organization, strong diversity leadership includes creating, supporting, and inculcating strong diversity management plans and policies, as well as holding lower-level leadership accountable for using effective diversity leadership practices. Thus, this recommendation is linked to the Commission's recommendations on top leaders' personal involvement, on robust policies, and on accountability.

This recommendation in particular is aimed at the spectrum of diversity, from demographic to cognitive, structural, and global. Kraus et al. (2007) found that structural diversity (including cross-Service [joint] issues, but especially active-reserve diversity) posed the most problems in the deployed unit. Working with others outside of military command is likewise problematic. Individuals and groups representing host nations, nongovernmental organizations, allies, and other government agencies (federal, state, and local) are increasingly incorporated into U.S. military operations. Diversity leadership skills are required of everyone from the operational commander to the unit leader on the front lines of counterinsurgency. These skills are needed to make the most of the talent available, whatever its source.

In that vein, expert testimony comes from General J. Mattis, then commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command. Closing out the 2010 Joint Warfighting Conference at the Virginia Beach Convention Center, he stated:

In this age, I don't care how tactically or operationally brilliant you are, if you cannot create harmony—even vicious harmony—on the battlefield based on trust across service lines, across coalition and national lines, and across civilian/military lines, you really need to go home, because your leadership in today's age is obsolete. We have got to have officers who can create harmony across all those lines. (quoted in Boyer, 2010)

***Recommendation 4b—***

***Identifying and rewarding the skills needed to meet the operational challenges of the 21st century***

The 2010 QDR documents the changing nature of military operations and the range of skills needed for mission accomplishment (U.S. Department of Defense, 2010). The Commission views these changing requirements as a form of structural diversity and believes that they represent a culture shift.

Military operations have been changing, and the mix of skills required of the Armed Forces is, consequently, also in flux. A major assumption underlying this recommendation is that future leadership in the officer corps will require a greater mix of competencies to be effective in the future operational environment. Note that this assumption is supported by changes that have already occurred as a result of the war against Al-Qaeda and its Violent Extremist Affiliates and by forecasts of needed competencies for the future operational environment made in such reports as the QDR (U.S. Department of Defense, 2010). Both current and future operational missions are likely to be increasingly asymmetric and complex. This operational reality has required and will continue to require more officers to work collaboratively in interagency environments, with different governments, and in nation-building activities. This operational reality will also require continued decentralization of decisionmaking in the field by giving commanders more decisionmaking authority. Thus, to be effective in the future operational environment, officers will likely require "greater expertise in foreign language, regional, and cultural skills" (U.S. Department of Defense,

2010, p. 54). DoD has already started to move in this direction by investing in the “first active duty civil affairs brigade to support general purpose forces” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, p. 25).

The emerging requirements for expertise come in part from the designation of stability operations as a core U.S. military mission, in DoD Instruction 3000.05. The instruction

reflects longstanding concerns that the U.S. armed services may not possess enough people with the skills necessary for stability operations. . . . In particular, the directive reflects concern about developing enough foreign area officers, enlisted regional specialists, civil affairs personnel, military police, engineers, and psychological operations personnel. These specialties have long been noted as having insufficient personnel to meet the demands . . . . (Serafino, 2006, p. 41)

Our recommendation supports the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness)’s USD[P&R]’s tasking in DoD Instruction 3000.05 to “[i]dentify personnel and training requirements for stability operations and evaluate DoD progress in developing forces to meet those requirements.”

The 2010 QDR includes cyberspace, as well as stability operations, in its list of key missions (U.S. Department of Defense, 2010). In its treatment of cyberspace, the QDR Independent Review Panel lends support to the need for new types of personnel to meet new missions:

The Panel believes the Department’s role in cyberspace must be fully resourced. Indeed, an increase in resources to the cyber mission is warranted. We also believe the Department of Defense should explore innovative ways to harness the enormous intellectual capital in the information realm in the service of the nation. The military services, for example, should explore standing up reserve component units for cyber missions in areas of the country where those skills are particularly plentiful, such as California’s Silicon Valley. . . . Currently, there is neither a holistic career management strategy for these cyber professionals in any military service or across the joint force, *nor an adequate system of incentives to hold on to these critical individuals given the incredibly competitive marketplace for cyber expertise*. To rectify this gap, the Department of Defense should develop a joint career path for cyber professionals that enables effective recruitment and retention. (Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel, 2010, pp. 62–63, emphasis added)

The skills listed above are not well represented among military leadership. Issue Paper #23 contains evidence of the preponderance of flag billets held by those in tactical/operational occupations, or warfare specialties. It found that officers from operational occupations make up a much larger fraction of the flag officer corps than of officers from the lower ranks. For example, in 2006, combat arms occupations constituted 7.7 percent of Army occupations and were held by 29.4 percent of all Army personnel (Harrell et al., 2007). However, 80 percent of general officers (O-7 and above) came from combat arms occupations (Lim et al., 2009). This pattern suggests that a tactical/operational background is important for officers seeking to break into the flag ranks and that the current system does not provide as many opportunities for those in other occupations.

DoD is already addressing structural diversity through its work in total force integration and the maturation of an operational reserve. Embracing and integrating this type of diversity is increasingly important to mission accomplishment. Besides the example of cyber missions, other relevant expertise may be readily available in the civilian skill set possessed by reservists. Efforts are also ongoing to incorporate government employees from a range of agencies into overseas operations.

Many needed skills may best be acquired through incorporating reserves, civilians, and contractors more closely into the total force. In addition, the Services may want to explore lateral entry, bringing on to active duty older people who already possess the experience and expertise that would be difficult, costly, and time-consuming to create from scratch.

To attract and retain the range of talent it needs, the Services may need to broaden their conception of who belongs in the military and what it takes to be a member of the Armed Forces. A wider range of requirements will require acceptance of more types of people. For example, can a remotely piloted vehicle operator do his job from a wheelchair? To compete with the demands of the private sector, does the military need to adapt to the ethos of the “computer nerd”? These questions deserve further study.

The bottom line remains: Changing operational requirements require new expertise to be sought out, developed, and integrated into both the workforce and the leadership. How do the Services implement this recommendation? How do they indicate that they value important new skills? At the June 2010 Commission meeting, Admiral Roughead recommended looking at promotion board precepts (the guidance provided to promotion boards). He indicated that he has revised the Navy’s precepts to reflect changing needs, with visible results in the mix of skill sets among 1-star officers. He suggested that the way to shape the force for tomorrow is to change the precepts today (Roughead, 2010).

#### **Recommendation 4c—**

##### ***Using strategic communications plans to communicate the diversity vision and values***

A first step in achieving culture change is a high-profile rollout of values and vision with leadership visibility. To then solidify and maintain a new corporate culture requires multiple, interlocking exposures to core values. Any one such activity alone is unlikely to have much effect, if any (Issue Paper #21).

A well-organized communication plan is vital for successful culture change. To disseminate the vision to all members of the organization, various forms of communication should be used. Although verbal communication is necessary, other supportive forms, such as posters, ads, policies, and processes, should also be used. These methods of communication serve as constant reminders of the vision and, therefore, of the goals and outcomes of the change initiative (Issue Paper #21).

The plan should have consistent internal and external components that explain the importance of diversity, inclusion, and diversity leadership to the Armed Forces. It should also address explicitly the value added by diversity. Finally, the individual servicemember should be able to understand the expectations and implications of diversity and inclusion for his or her behavior. The message would be clear that diversity is not a code word for affirmative action and that diversity management is different from EO. As one representative from private industry put it,

what’s very critical, I think, is making sure that in your communications with the organization, you are *articulating the fact that what you are doing is about making the organization—the entire organization and everyone*

*that's a part of the organization—more successful.* That this is about growth, not just for some of the organization, of the institution, but for everyone. Everyone has opportunities to grow; the entire institution is going to be better off as a result of the particular change that we are introducing.

So I would tell you, resistance is just part of any particular change initiative, no surprise here, but I think in particular, in this particular topic, because it can be laden with other different agendas. You have to communicate that this is not about a segment or a sub-segment of the institution, it's about everyone and all of us; we're all [in] it together to make it a stronger institution. (Montelongo, 2010, emphasis added)

## RECOMMENDATION 5

### **Recommendation 5—**

#### **DoD should institute mechanisms for accountability and internal and external monitoring at OSD and Service levels, including the Reserve Component.**

Over the years, there have been many reports, studies, and bodies established to look at EO and racial, ethnic, and gender representation in the military. The Commission has heard that in the past, when progress was made in increasing demographic diversity among senior officers, there was no deliberate, coordinated effort to monitor that progress and ensure that it continued.

Major reports from the last 15 years include the following:

- *Planning For Diversity: Options and Recommendations for DoD Leaders* (Lim et al., 2008)
  - Diversity focus
  - The report draws on findings from the DoD Diversity Summit convened by RAND on behalf of ODMEO in February 2007, which included participants from academia and the public and private sectors. It was intended to lay the groundwork for DoD's strategic plan to increase racial, ethnic, and gender diversity among its active-duty and civilian leadership.
- *Increasing Diversity in DoD's Flag and Senior Executive Ranks* (Defense Business Board, 2004)
  - Demographic representation focus
  - At the behest of the Assistant Secretaries for Manpower and Reserve Affairs from the Services and USD (P&R), the Defense Business Board researched strategies to achieve greater representation in the flag/general officer and SES ranks of underrepresented minority groups. The resulting report and recommendations compile best practices and lessons learned from private sector companies considered to be diversity leaders.
- *Minority and Gender Differences in Officer Career Progression* (Hosek et al., 2001)
  - EO focus
  - This report by the RAND Corporation documents research on the career progression of the different minority and gender groups in the officer corps; this research also informed the following report (*Career Progression of Minority and Women Officers*). The report is based on research conducted from 1994 to 1996 for a DoD EO study requested by Secretary of Defense William Perry and carried out by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness in 1999.
- *Career Progression of Minority and Women Officers* (aka the Pipeline Study; Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness, 1999)
  - EO focus. In dealing with the career life-cycle aspects relevant to diversity and diversity management, it also begins to touch on diversity.
  - The 1999 study done under USD (P&R) reviewed the stages of officer career progression: recruiting, commissioning, training, assignment, evaluation, promotion, and retention. It was limited to active-duty commissioned officers in

the four military branches of DoD and examined data collected through 1997. The recommendations suggest actions that could be taken to improve the process of providing EO to minority and female members in the officer corps.

- *Report of the Task Force on Discrimination and Sexual Harassment* (Defense Equal Opportunity Council, 1995)
  - EO focus; discrimination and sexual harassment focus
  - The Deputy Secretary of Defense asked the Secretary of the Air Force and the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to develop a sexual harassment policy action plan in 1994. The elements of the plan included the establishment of the Defense Equal Opportunity Council (DEOC) Task Force on Discrimination and Sexual Harassment and undertaking of a Department-wide sexual harassment survey. This report includes the findings.
- *Affirmative Action and Equal Opportunity in the Military Report to the President* (7. *Affirmative Action and Equal Opportunity in the Military*, n.d.)
  - EO focus
  - The results of a 1995 report to President Bill Clinton assessing the state of affirmative action programs in the military, whether they worked, and if they were fair. The report has also been known as the “Mend It, Don’t End It” report.

The very existence of this series of reports (and that of the Commission itself) over time indicates a recurring problem. To stop the cycle, leader accountability and mechanisms for continuous monitoring of diversity policy, practices, and results need to be developed and maintained.

## Accountability

Lessons from the private sector indicate several best practices in achieving accountability: using a variety of metrics and evaluating leaders at all levels. Allstate Insurance Company’s CDO, noting that diversity “sits on everyone’s desk,” described a multifaceted approach: “We embed the accountability for diversity into many things and we find that it is most effective if it shows up in multiple places and in different ways throughout the corporation” (Babcock, 2009).

Sodexo provides a clear example of holding leaders accountable for demographic diversity at all levels of management. Since 2002, the company has been holding managers and executives accountable for diversity management by linking results on a diversity scorecard (a set of metrics that assess progress in hiring, promoting, and retaining women and members of minority groups) with a sizable portion of management bonuses. These portions can be as much as 15 percent of the total bonus for managers and 25 percent for executives. According to Anand, “What we have found is that having the metrics without the accountability is just half of the equation. . . . We want to make sure that we have the commitment and engagement of management at all levels” (Anand, 2010).

A broader approach to accountability for diversity management is in place at Lockheed Martin, as described by Geeth Chettiar, vice president, diversity and equal opportunity programs, at the June 2010 Commission meeting. This defense contractor has developed a holistic metric, calculated for each business unit and based on three factors:

- climate, based on survey results
- diversity processes and infrastructure, such as affinity groups and diversity councils
- trends in demographic representation and attrition.

A portion of executive bonuses is tied to these metrics. Furthermore, the surveys are confidential rather than anonymous, allowing data to be examined down to the first-line leader level. Action plans are created based on the survey results, and leaders are held accountable for their performance in carrying out the plans, with monetary rewards for those who excel.

The Commission drew on best practices from the Services, the private sector, and DoD's past to formulate six subrecommendations designed to increase accountability for both individuals' diversity leadership practices, and racial, ethnic, and gender representation in the Armed Forces.

***Recommendation 5a—***

***Embed diversity leadership in performance assessment throughout careers.***

Discussions about evaluating an individual's diversity leadership often center around the difficulty of measuring such a thing. As discussed in Decision Paper #6, the Commission's vision of good diversity leadership is not just about increasing racial, ethnic, and gender representation; it includes leading groups in a way that leverages their diversity. This perspective makes diversity leadership more difficult to evaluate, but, based on its understanding of private sector practices and military culture, the Commission believes that such an assessment is possible. Possible mechanisms for embedding diversity leadership as part of the core competencies expected of a servicemember include the following:

- documentation of one's diversity leadership in a self-statement
- incorporation of diversity perspective into leadership assessment
- 360-degree evaluations
- utilization of relevant indicators
  - climate survey trends
  - discipline and EO data
  - retention rates.

A simple checkbox on an assessment form, however, will accomplish nothing. An alternative could be a self-statement documenting what one has done to foster an environment of inclusion, a Coast Guard practice. Another approach would draw from the Navy's incorporation of EO practices into its assessments of enlisted personnel. This could be expanded through incorporating diversity leadership and inclusion into the existing assessment of leadership in general.

Luke Visconti, CEO of DiversityInc and a former Navy officer, addressed this issue at a Commission meeting:

Now, I know that [the] military doesn't pay bonuses to senior officers for achievement of goals, but . . . part of the issue that the military is having is that the fitness report is inadequate to measure diversity management abilities of any officer or of any senior listed person and that has to change. . . . [T]hey should divide up the attributes of diversity management in terms of retention, accession, assignment, all of these things that indicate that you are equitably caring for people and they should be distributed in the three blocks that really matter on an officer's fitness report, and in that way you do have a direct tieback to a bonus. You don't make [O-6] if your fitness reports aren't competitive, same thing as a bonus. You don't get selected to flag if your [O-6] fitness

reports weren't good. Same thing as a bonus. . . . It's really very simple, isn't it, when you get down to it? (Visconti, 2010)

The Services could experiment with 360-degree evaluations. Even though this practice runs counter to the military's hierarchical culture, there is a description of such an assessment in the Army Field Manual on leadership (U.S. Army, 2006, pp. 8–44):

Self-aware leaders are open to feedback and actively seek it. A leader's goal in obtaining feedback is to develop an accurate self-perception by understanding other people's perceptions. Many leaders have successfully used a multisource assessment and feedback method to gain insight. A multisource assessment is a formal measure of peer, subordinate, superior, and self-impressions of a single individual. It may provide critical feedback and insights that are otherwise not apparent.

Rohini Anand described Sodexo's use of the 360-degree evaluation for the corporation's leadership:

We actually culminate it with 360s around diversity and inclusion for our executive team. Now those of you that have done 360s know that this is not an easy process. The feedback can be difficult. . . .

[They] were asked to have their peers, their subordinates and their bosses fill out a 360 on them. The feedback was presented back to them. They then developed action plans based on that feedback and those were monitored twice a year. (Anand, 2010)

Other options involve a careful utilization of numerical indicators. Possible metrics include trends in climate surveys, unit disciplinary and EO data, and retention rates. While it is expected that such data will form part of the accountability reviews described in Recommendation 5d, it may be worth examining their usage in individual assessment at a lower level.

Both quantitative and qualitative metrics are important and should be utilized. Whereas quantitative metrics are generally easier to collect, making the extra effort to integrate both types provides a more complete picture of an individual's diversity leadership. At Sodexo, for example,

the quantitative metrics look at recruiting, retention, promotion of women and minorities. The qualitative metrics . . . are about behavior change. We look at things like mentoring, like engagement in the community . . . [and] training. . . .

So, the qualitative aspect of the scorecard [has] been very, very critical in changing the behaviors because otherwise it becomes just a numbers game, "the quota has to be filled" is how it's perceived. But here what we are saying is, their behavior systemically need[s] to be changed. If you get the right behaviors, you'll get to the numbers. So, we look at really both of those. (Anand, 2010)

**Recommendation 5b—*****Establish diversity leadership as a criterion for nomination and appointment to senior enlisted leadership positions and Flag and General officers, including 3-star and 4-star positions and Service Chief.***

The assessment of diversity leadership performance must be extended to the highest levels of the Services. Demonstrated diversity leadership should be a topic of conversation in both the nomination and confirmation of flag and general officers to 3- and 4-star positions, both within DoD and in the confirmation process. While this is important for all senior leadership positions, it is especially relevant for Service Chiefs. As discussed earlier in this paper, personal commitment at the top is a crucial ingredient in establishing and sustaining successful diversity management throughout an organization.

In response to a question about how her company ensures that executives hired from outside are as committed to diversity and inclusion as the rest of the senior team, Anand's reply indicated the importance of including diversity leadership in the interview process:

[T]he candidates who've come from the outside to Sodexo have actually said that they are very surprised [at] the emphasis that the organization places on diversity in the interview process, so they really are asked about their commitment, what they have done, their understanding. And if they are not articulate on this particular topic, we don't seriously consider them. (Anand, 2010)

Along these lines, the Commission believes that those individuals considered for top leadership positions, both senior enlisted appointments and 3- and 4-star nominations, should be expected to be "articulate on this particular topic." They should be able to address their experience in providing diversity leadership and their understanding of its connection to mission accomplishment. The Commission recommends two ways to enhance accountability.

**Recommendation 5bi—*****Formalize the process and requirements for 3- and 4-star selection in DoD Instruction 1320.4, Military Officer Actions Requiring Approval of the Secretary of Defense or the President, or Confirmation by the Senate.***

In addition, the process for selection of flag officers, from O-7 through O-10, should be made transparent through its description and documentation in a policy statement. DoD Instruction 1320.4 contains some information on O-7 to O-8 and O-9 to O-10 promotions, but it lacks an overview of the entire process (U.S. Department of Defense, 1995a). A new instruction should be issued that provides a flow chart of the process and describes the roles played by the Service 4-stars, Service Chief and Secretary, the Joint Chiefs and the Chairman, and the Secretary of Defense.

Some procedures begun during the George W. Bush administration should be considered for inclusion in that policy statement. These include requiring the Services to broaden the field of candidates, to brief the Secretary of Defense on their succession plan, to look deliberately at the long-term impact of each individual selection, and to submit slates of candidates, not just a single name, for 3- and 4-star positions. Succession planning of this type will help sustain progress in achieving diversity in the senior leadership.

**Recommendation 5bii—****Include a statement in the Senate Armed Services Committee questionnaire.**

Diversity leadership qualifications should not only be addressed in interviews within DoD. The Commission suggests that the Senate Armed Services Committee, through which all nominations for 3- and 4-star positions flow, add to its questionnaire a self-statement describing one's diversity leadership. Introducing this requirement would be another step in sustaining the emphasis on diversity that has waxed and waned in the past.

**Recommendation 5c—****Transfer the functions of the former Defense Equal Opportunity Council (DEOC) to a periodic meeting of the existing Defense Advisory Working Group (DAWG).**

As part of an integrated, strategic approach to accountability, the Commission recommends that DoD revisit the goals and duties ascribed to the now-defunct DEOC with an eye toward transferring applicable goals and duties to DAWG. The membership of the DAWG is close to that of the former DEOC, and specifying diversity, broadly defined, as part of the DAWG's mission and purview will reinstate the high-level attention to EO that had been allowed to lapse and will expand it to encompass other aspects of diversity.<sup>21</sup>

The DEOC, first established in 1987, was given the responsibility to "advise the Secretary of Defense on policies for EO matters, coordinate policy and review the military and civilian EO programs, monitor progress of program elements, assist in developing policy guidance for education and training in EO and human relations for DoD personnel, and provide oversight and ensure resources for DEOMI" (U.S. Department of Defense, 1995b). DEOC members presented regular progress reports on how well the DoD was meeting EO goals and appointed members to attend to specific issues by forming working committees, such as the DEOC Task Force on Discrimination and Sexual Harassment.

The DAWG, first established in conjunction with the QDR process, consists of the most-senior military and civilian leaders, including the co-chairs, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Meetings are held twice weekly and consist of presentations on and candid discussion of matters concerning military leadership. The Commission recommends that this body meet at least twice a year on diversity issues. Such meetings will form part of the strategic accountability system proposed by the Commission.

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<sup>21</sup> The chair and membership of the DEOC differ in the two directives that establish it, DoD Directive 1440.1, *DoD Civilian Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Program* and DoD Directive 1350.2, *Department of Defense Military Equal Opportunity (MEO) Program* (found at U.S. Department of Defense, 1987, and U.S. Department of Defense, 1995b, respectively). In the directive on EEO, first published in 1987, the chair is the ASN (FM&P); members included the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) (Reserve Affairs) and the military department's assistant secretaries for personnel policy and reserve affairs. The directive on MEO, first published in 1995, raised the bar, with the Deputy Secretary of Defense as chair, USD (P&R) as vice chair, and a membership including the Under Secretaries of Defense, the Secretaries of the military departments, and the Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The more-senior membership is close to that of the DAWG and ensured that the panel was sufficiently senior to assume leadership and take decisive action.

**Recommendation 5d—*****Institute a system of “accountability reviews.”***

An additional way to infuse diversity leadership from top to bottom is through a series of “accountability reviews.” This practice was initiated for the Navy by then-CNO Admiral Mike Mullen and expanded by CNO Admiral Gary Roughead. Admiral Roughead meets annually, one on one, with each of his 16 enterprise heads on the topic of racial, ethnic, and gender diversity. Each enterprise head prepares a report on the following for personnel in his or her enterprise:

- overall demographic diversity
- career path diversity
- promotion diversity
- retention diversity
- key billet diversity
- career milestone diversity.

The data are analyzed by race, ethnicity, and gender. Statistical variances are assessed, root cause analysis is performed, and corrective actions are determined. The reviews identify barriers to achieving a demographically diverse enterprise within the context of the military career life cycle. They also identify the assistance required to remove barriers. Each enterprise maps out a three-year plan with goals and performance measures. The enterprise head briefs the CNO on the findings and reviews progress with him annually (Barrett, 2010). According to CNO Roughead, these are “extraordinarily valuable. . . . [they have] focused leadership in a way that is more than shouting louder. It’s about substance, mentoring, development, understanding who you have, moving them along” (Roughead, 2010).

This recommendation uses the Navy’s accountability review construct as the basis for a series of similar sessions culminating in a meeting between the Secretary of Defense and each Service, represented by its Service Chief, Service Secretary, and senior enlisted advisor. To prepare for that meeting with the Secretary, enterprise heads or their equivalents from each Service would sit down with their chiefs of staff; then each of the Service Chiefs would brief his or her Secretary.<sup>22</sup>

Although the Navy’s accountability review is confined to addressing racial, ethnic, and gender diversity, additional aspects of diversity should be included when the wider set of metrics described in Decision Paper #8 is devised. Such a system would force diversity accountability down the chain as leaders prepared to brief up the chain. It would also serve as a powerful indicator of leader commitment to achieving and leading a diverse force.

**Recommendation 5e—*****Direct the “Research and Analysis” office to support the Chief Diversity Officer.***

For the CDO to be effective, he or she needs timely, accurate, insightful research and analysis based on objective, standardized data.

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<sup>22</sup> This recommendation envisions focused annual meetings between the Secretary of Defense and the different Service Secretaries, Service Chiefs, and senior enlisted advisors; the DAWG, in contrast, would focus on policy and take on specific issues as they arose.

In its effort to provide recommendations that are executable, the Commission recommends that the CDO turn to the existing research and analysis (R&A) office within P&R. The office would work with the CDO to provide the data and analysis described in Recommendations 2 and 5d. This office should also support DACOWITS as it extends its scope to diversity as a whole (discussed in Recommendation 5f, below).

The R&A office should become a truly joint organization by including expert researchers from the major personnel centers of the Services. These Services' analysts could serve at R&A on a rotational basis. Such a program would institutionalize knowledge-sharing among the Services and OSD. Additional expertise could be provided by diversity experts at the federally funded research and development centers. This talent base should serve as an advisory team to support the CDO and the R&A office.

One example of the value that could be provided by this organization is the data analysis portion of the accountability review. Besides descriptive statistics on the racial, ethnic, and gender composition of the Services, the analysis should include more-nuanced information, such as command climate indicators. Survey data are one means of assessing command climate and the extent to which it is inclusive. Data on EO and sexual harassment complaints provide another source of information. A third metric for an inclusive environment is provided by discipline data: court martial cases and nonjudicial punishment. Each discipline data point represents the results of an investigation that provided sufficient evidence to bring charges; the survey data, based on anonymous responses from self-selected samples of servicemembers, may provide evidence of numerous issues that do not individually rise to an actionable level. All three types of data, properly and fully analyzed, can paint a more complete picture than one metric alone.

#### ***Recommendation 5f—***

##### ***Expand the charter of the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS) to encompass diversity as a whole.***

This recommendation responds directly to a specific charter task: "Consider the benefits of conducting an annual conference focused on diversity attended by DoD civilians, active duty and retired military personnel, and corporate leaders, to include a review of current policy and the annual demographic data from the DEOMI and DMDC." The Commission has taken this task about an annual conference, made the conference more frequent, and added some more specifics.

In essence, the Commission suggests that the well-established and familiar DACOWITS expand its charter beyond gender to include diversity of all types. The group would hold regular meetings and receive briefings by DoD leadership on metrics and progress made on implementing diversity management plans and policies. It would also sponsor specific studies of interest.

The Commission notes that DACOWITS dates to 1951 and has provided a clear, unapologetic forum on issues for women in the military. This focus must not disappear when other elements of diversity are addressed.

## **Conclusion**

Evidence from the private sector and from current practices in the Services indicates the following requirements for successful diversity programs:

- the active involvement of top leaders
- clear policy incorporated into the business plan

- a strategic framework embodied in a diversity-friendly culture
- accountability and incentives for results and behaviors
- succession planning, defined as “a process of systematically and deliberately preparing for future changes of leadership in key positions.”

As the Commission reviewed DoD’s and the military Services’ diversity programs, it found that:

- Top leader involvement was, in most cases, well below the leadership involvement of top performers in the private sector, including the defense industry.
- Diversity policies were not clear, some EO policies had been ignored, and there were few fleshed-out plans.
- In most cases, there was no strategic framework for diversity efforts, and the culture was not addressed.
- In most cases, there was no accountability or incentives for results or behaviors.
- Succession planning is conducted, but procedures have not been documented.

Based on the evidence, the Commission believes that successful implementation of and accountability for diversity initiatives requires a strategic approach. Piecemeal efforts will not effect the change in culture that is needed, nor will they address all of the stages of a servicemember’s career. Clear, robust policies that specify roles, responsibilities, authorities, and accountability are required to institutionalize change. The legal underpinnings of regulations and policies must also be addressed. Unequivocal, strong, and visible commitment from top leadership is the key ingredient in a successful and coherent diversity program, especially when it is reflected in the organizational structure. However, to ensure that progress continues, a monitoring mechanism is also required.

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